



PARADIGM OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND THE STATE

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ABSTRACT

Religion has a central role in the history of world civilization. From the era of the Indus River Valley Civilization, Mesopotamia, to the golden age of the Islamic Caliphate and the European Colonialist Empire. Kings, emperors, and sultans always established close relations with intellectuals and religious leaders. Religion has been a tool for governing society since the beginning of human history. The research method used in this literature review involves analyzing various literature sources relevant to the theme of religion and state relations in the context of Islamic perspectives. This research will focus on the development of views in the context of the 20th century with the emergence of integralistic, symbiotic, and secularistic paradigms in managing the relationship between religion and state, to provide a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of this thought in a relevant time frame. All these paradigms reflect the complex dynamics in the debate over the concept and implementation of the relationship between religion and state within the framework of Islamic thought.

Keywords: Relations, Religion, Country

INTRODUCTION

In the context of the discourse on the relationship between religion and state in Islam, there are a number of views and perspectives that reflect the complexity and diversity of interpretations (Malek et al., 2012). The long history of this discussion has recorded essential questions such as the existence of postulates in the Qur'an and Hadith indicating the command to establish a state. In the discourse of Islamic thought, there are three main schools of view on the relationship between religion and state. First, the view that considers Islam as a system that governs all aspects of life, including politics and statehood, is reflected in the movement that carries the Caliphate. The second school emphasizes that Islam has no specific demands related to statehood, its focus is more on moral formation. The third school, represented by Muhammad Husain Haikal, considers that Islam does not determine a specific model of statehood, but provides a set of values or ethics in running state life.

Discussions on the relationship between religion and state intensified in the 19th to early 20th centuries as a result of modernity and the interaction of the Islamic world with colonialism (Kobo, 2023). The question of whether in Islam there is a concept of the state being central, where religion is inseparable from power before the experience of colonialism. The existence of an official view of religion determined by the state is a theme that involves a number of groups,

including Islamic groups themselves. Despite differences of opinion, some Muslims assert that Islam, as a view of life, only teaches the guidance of morality in practice. For example, justice takes precedence even if the leader of a country does not believe. This diversity of views reflects the complexity of the discussion of the relationship between religion and state in Islam, which has evolved over time and in changing historical contexts.

This research is in-depth about views and paradigms related to the relationship between religion and the state in an Islamic perspective (Mahmudin et al., 2021). The first school emphasizes that Islam is not only a teaching of the relationship between man and God, but also a comprehensive system that covers all aspects of life, including politics and statehood (Nasikhin & Shodiq, 2021). Movements such as *Ḥizb al-Taḥrîr* expressed this view by promoting the concept of the Caliphate. The purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the views that develop in the Islamic perspective regarding the relationship between religion and state, especially involving three emerging streams of views. First, the research aims to understand more deeply the view of the first school that considers Islam as a system that governs all aspects of life, including politics and statehood, as reflected in the *Khilafah* movement promoted by *Ḥizb al-Taḥrîr*. Second, the study aims to analyze the second school which emphasizes that Islam does not have special demands related to statehood, the focus is more on moral formation. Furthermore, the study also aims to understand the view of the third school, represented by Muhammad Husain Haikal, which states that Islam does not determine a specific model of statehood, but rather provides a set of values or ethics to run a state life.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses literature review research methods as an approach to investigate and analyze views and paradigms related to religious relations with the state in an Islamic perspective (Mishra & Alok, 2022). The focus of this research covers a long history of discourse on this issue, paying attention to the essential question surrounding the existence of postulates in the Qur'an and Hadith that indicate the command to establish a state. Historical and theological approaches became the main basis of research, where Bachtiar Effendy observed the confrontation between historical and comparative perspectives.

The object of this study involves a number of views and perspectives that reflect the complexity and diversity of interpretations regarding the relationship between religion and state in Islam. The source of research data is sourced from related literature, including books by Bachtiar Effendy, thoughts of Islamic figures, and works that discuss the history of religious and state thought in Islam. The population of this study includes literature relevant to the theme of religion and state relations in Islam. The sample is a collection of classical and contemporary texts representing various views and schools of Islamic thought related to the issue.

The analytical techniques used in this study involve critical analysis of the various literature taken as samples. The analysis was conducted to understand the views of the first school which considers Islam as a system that regulates all aspects of life, the second school which emphasizes that Islam has no special demands related to statehood, and the third school which sees Islam as providing a set of values or ethics to run a state life. By combining literature review methods, this study seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the complexity and diversity of views related to the relationship between religion and state in Islam. The analysis

covers historical and theological developments, strengthens theoretical foundations, and contributes to contemporary understanding of the issue.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In relation to the relationship between State and Religion, according to the integralistic theory that between State and Religion are integrated. The state apart from being a political institution is also a religious institution (Karimullah, 2022). According to Integralistic theory, the head of state is the holder of religious power and political power. His government was organized on the basis of "divine sovereignty", because proponents of this theory believed that sovereignty originated and was in the "hands of God". The integralistic paradigm adheres to the understanding that religion in reality is not only a doctrine that guides humans from a spiritual aspect, but also seeks to build a constitutional system (Inayati & Pratama, 2022).

According to this paradigm, religion can also be interpreted as a political and state institution, not only regulating human relations with God but regulating relationships between human beings, both in social and political aspects of statehood. With this doctrine religion is understood as political theology. In the end, religion becomes a necessity, especially in an effort to position religion as the basis of the state so that religion and politics cannot be separated must be formed formalistic-legalistic.

This integralistic theory gave birth to the notion of the religious state (theocracy). In the notion of religious state (theocracy), the relationship between State and Religion is described as two things that cannot be separated. The state is united with religion, because government is run based on God's words, and all life systems in society, nation, and state are carried out by "God's command". Thus, state or political affairs, in theocracy are believed to be manifestations of God's word, so they are inseparable from religious affairs.

In the integralistic paradigm, the religious (spiritual; rite) region merges with the state (public; political) territory. This paradigm is often criticized for allowing the hegemony of one religious group (generally even one particular denomination, madhhab or sect) over the running of the government. Various public policies can then benefit the religious group, even its figures can enrich themselves through the path of power.

In Islam, this intergralistic paradigm or traditionalist mindset, among others, is adopted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Shia adherents in Iran (Revkin & Ahram, 2020). Shia consider this paradigm relevant if the concept of Imâmah or leadership is applied. The Shia paradigm emphasizes walâyah (love and devotion to God), which belongs only to the descendants of the Prophet as entitled to be heads of state (Imâmah) (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020). As a political institution based on religious legitimacy and has the function of administering the "sovereignty of God" the country, in the Shi'a perspective, is theocratic. The theocratic state contains an element of understanding that absolute power is in the hands of God, and the constitution of the state is based on God's revelation (Sharia). The theocratic nature of the state in the Shi'a view can be found in the thinking of many Shi'a political scholars. Khomeini, for example, stated that in the Islamic State the authority to establish law rests with God. No one has the right to enact the law. And all that may apply is the law of God (Al-Dawoody et al., 2021).

Nevertheless, contemporary Iranian political thinkers reject the Islamic Republic's denunciation of the theocratic state. Iran's state system does imply a "democratic" nature, as

demonstrated by the application of the principle of power distribution based on the Trias Politica principle, and the use of the term republic as a form of state itself. (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran). The paradigm of "unification" of religion and state is also an example of the group of "Islamic fundamentalism" which tends to be oriented towards Islamic values which it considers fundamental and principled. The paradigm of fundamentalism emphasizes the totality of Islam, namely that Islam covers all aspects of life. According to one of the group's leaders, al-Maudûdi (d. 1979), Sharia does not recognize a separation between religion and politics or between religion and state. "Sharia is a perfect scheme of life and pervades the entire fabric of society; There is nothing more and nothing less"(Shah, 2020).

The Islamic state based on Shari'ah, in al-Maudûdi's view, should be based on four basic principles, namely: that it recognizes the sovereignty of God, accepts the authority of Prophet Muhanunad (PBUH), has the status of "representative of God", and implements deliberation . Based on these principles, real sovereignty rests with God. The state serves as a political vehicle for implementing God's laws, in its status as God's representative. In such a perspective, Maudûdi's conception of an Islamic state is theocratic, especially concerning the constitution of the state which must be based on the Shari'a. But al-Maudûdi himself rejected the term preferring the term "theo-democratic", because his conception contained a democratic element, that is, the opportunity for the people to choose the leader of the state.

In Islam, this idea of thought or understanding is expressed in the course of history manifested in the organization of the Islamic movement Ikhwân al-Muslmîn in Egypt and the Islâmiyah Jam'ah. The Egyptian-born Jam'ah Islâmiyah (JI) is a splinter organization of Ikhwân al-Muslmîn. Of course, JI has always been synonymous with radical Islamic movements. Similarly, the JI founded by Al-Maudûdi in Pakistan was the ideologue Ikhwân al-Muslmîn, and the same figure fought against the ruling government which was considered incompatible with Islamic teachings.

The JI movement in Egypt was born on the eve of the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Riduwan & Mahmud, 2023). At that time, Egypt was experiencing a very sensitive socio-political situation, because two years before Sadat's death there had been a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt known as the Camp David Agreement (1979). Those two years (1979-1981) were sensitive because Sadat had actually made a very different and very unpopular political breakthrough, namely signing a peace agreement. Like other radical Islamic initiatives, JI was also inspired by the works of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1906-1966 CE) and Hassan Al-Banna which were steeped in anti-foreign and anti-American ideology in particular.

This is what they stand on. JI is indeed an outspoken Pan-Islamism movement that was promoted by Jamaluddin Al-Afghani in the 19th century which called that, 'Muslims must unite under the banner of the command of Khâlîfah Universal Sultan Abdul Hamid II based in Istanbul, in order to fight the West'. To facilitate the achievement of the benefit of Muslims, Afghani condemned Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan for not being in line with Afghani's flag of Pan-Islamism. Khan stressed that the benefit and prosperity of Indian Muslims should not be equated with the benefit and prosperity of Turkey. On the other hand, Indian Muslims never submitted to the Caliph in Istanbul (Petrovich, 2020).

The group escalated its violence when it was kicked out of the circle of the country's institutional political system by the Egyptian government regime and faced with brutal repression that was reactive and indiscriminate. In their view, Pan-Islamism is an alternative to

the nation-state system which they think must be changed because it ushers in foreign hegemony over Muslim countries, they carry the idea of Pan-Islamism. This idea of Pan-Islamism is essentially the same as the idea of an Islamic caliphate, establishing an international Islamic state. So, they want to go back in time like the Ottoman Dynasty that once ruled Turkey and other Islamic countries. His idea was to establish an international Islamic state, as declared by Tandzîmul Qâidah in 1998, which is often referred to as a front against Jews and Christians. In their view, that "noble" cause has been hampered by many Jewish conspiracies. Both organizations are moving towards strengthening the base of Muslims as the ideology of their movement which is based on a strong political theology and rooted in its ideas and attitudes as advocates of fundamentalist Islamic movements and wants to place Islam as an ideology. Against this practice the danger is that Islam is reduced to the work of human thought.

This group is specifically divided into two streams, namely traditionalism and fundamentalism. The traditionalists are those who still want to maintain the tradition of the rule of the Prophet and the four caliphs, with the central figure being Muhammad Rashid Ridha. Fundamentalists are those who want to reform the social system, system of government and state in order to return to the concept of Islam totally and reject other concepts, and Abû A'lâ al-Mawdûdi is one of them.

Al-Mawdûdi describes three arguments that explain that religion and state are one. First, because Allah Almighty is the creator of the entire universe, including humans and the things needed by those humans. Second, God is the King, Judge, and Regulator of His will. Third, that the Hâkimiyyah (law-setting) nature of the universe is not owned by anyone except Allah Himself and no one can be ordinary and entitled to have that attribute except Allah. From these three arguments, al-Mawdûdi then concluded after quoting several verses, that whoever makes a law that is different from the law of Allah, he is no longer judged only as a mistake or haram, but the maker and who follows it can be labeled heretic and infidel because all laws that differ from the law of Allah are the laws of Jahiliyah (hukm al-Jâhiliyyah), whereas the nature of Hâkimiyyah Allah means that it has a binding nature.

Therefore, al-Mawdûdi rejects nationalism as one of the principles that implies rejecting the teachings of God. According to him, the idea of nationalism is often seen beautiful by inviting people to realize that they are one nation, culture, ethnicity, and their human rights must be defended. But in practice, nationalism also establishes identity to assert a nationality that is different from other groups, so that there are differences in nation (nation), and then limited by territorial boundaries. In fact, al-Mawdûdi said, the laws revealed by Allah apply to anyone as long as he believes in Allah, however different languages, ethnicities, and cultures. Mawdûdi says even nationalism is an attempt by a few to distance most people from divine authority and God's law. Looking at al-Mawdûdi's ideas, we cannot immediately say that al-Mawdûdi only encourages one thought. Elisha Grunchi tried to periodize al-Mawdûdi's ideas. The expiration of al-Mawdûdi's period of ideas shows that his ideas related to God's sovereignty were not directly characterized as a political movement until al-Mawdûdi founded Jam'at al-Islâmi in 1947.

Yūsuf al-Qardhâwî in his book *Min Fiqh al-Dawlah* actually holds a similar view. Al-Qardhâwî offers a number of characteristics that are in accordance with Islamic teachings. First, the country is administered on the principles of shura and baiat (election of leaders), not elected by a group of people called religionists (Rijâl al-Dîn). Al-Qardhâwî mentions that he

rejects theocracy, and calls his concept a *madaniyya dawlah*. But he also rejected the model of a state that did not recognize religion at all (al-Qardhâwî used the term *Dawlah 'Ilmâniyyah*. He gave an example by mentioning communist countries (*al-dawlah al-Shuyû'iyyah*). The second characteristic is a unified state for all Muslims and not limited by geographical boundaries (Ayu & Pratiwi, 2021). A country that accommodates all races, nations, languages, and is united only by religious ties (Farhan et al., 2020). Then what about the condition of the country that is limited by national borders? Al-Qardhâwî believes that among countries that make Islam as *shir'a* and *minhâj* (the foundation of the state), in the future must have an orientation to unite it into a unity that overshadows these Islamic countries, for example in the form of federations (White et al., 2021).

If that is realized, al-Qardhâwî said it must have 3 elements: 1) the unity of Islamic territory despite different regions and state names; 2) the unity of the highest source of law, which derives from the Qur'an and Sunnah; 3) there is a central leadership, which can be referred to as *al-Imâm al-A'ẓam* or *al-Khalîfah* that leads countries based on Islam. Regarding the presence of non-Muslims in countries that make Islam the foundation of the state, al-Qardhâwî mentioned that non-Muslims remain free to practice their religion and personal affairs as long as they obey the state rules extracted from the *Shari'a*. A third characteristic of a state in accordance with Islamic teachings is a state based on a legitimate constitution, whose leader can be criticized for carrying out activities contrary to the "constitution." And the fourth feature is that it is deliberation-based (*syûrâ/parliament*), and not royal or imperial (*Kisrawiyyâh*). Both the ideas of figures like al-Mawdûdi and al-Qardhâwî were not without criticism. Some scholars, such as Syadzali and Grunchi, have come to the same conclusion that al-Mawdûdi's ideas in his travels had many contradictions and inconsistencies (Afroj et al., 2021).

According to symbiotic theory, the relationship between state and religion needs each other. Religion needs a state because with the state, religion can develop. Conversely, the state also needs religion, because with religion the state can develop in ethical and moral-spiritual guidance. Because of its symbiotic nature, religious law still has the opportunity to color state laws, even in certain problems it does not rule out the possibility of religious law being used as state law (Mokhtar, 2022).

The state according to this paradigm needs ethical and moral guidance as taught by religion. While religion itself requires state control for its preservation and existence or religion requires a 'helper sword', namely the state. Without a 'sword of help' to support it, religion with all its perfect and comprehensive teachings would not be possible in social reality. With this kind of relationship, both are in a symbiotic-mutualistic dimension and do not reduce religion or equate tools with treaties (Moore & Mueller, 2024).

This view argues that the relationship between religion and state is an institution that needs each other and is reciprocal (Parsell & Clarke, 2022). So in this view religion needs the state to preserve and develop religion. Vice versa, the state needs religion as a source of moral, ethical, and spiritual teachings of its citizens (Culpeper & Tantucci, 2021). This view is the same as what Ibn Taymiyyah said about the state as a religious instrument as described above, where the power that regulates human life is the greatest religious obligation, because without religious power the state cannot stand upright. So the relationship between religion and state are two different identities but need each other. Therefore, the constitution contained in this

paradigm is not only from the social contract but also religious law. So that the Indonesian government is also included in this paradigm group because religion does not dominate state life, but as a moral source for the life of the nation and state.

Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah said that the existence of power that regulates human life is the greatest obligation of Religion, because without the power of the State, Religion cannot stand upright. Ibn Taymiyyah's opinion legitimizes that the State and Religion are two different entities, but need each other. Therefore, the constitution that applies in this paradigm does not only come from the existence of social contracts, but can be colored or animated by religious law.

The political theological style of this group is that the relationship between religion and state is based on ethical principles, therefore they state that there are demands or strong indications of a standard reference to the political system and government in Islam are not found and proven at all, meaning that argumentatively there is no conception that clearly contains provisions about the source of state power, the executor of power, how the power is obtained, to whom the exercise is responsible.

By such logic, this group firmly states that Islam is in no way obligatory to its people to make Islam the ideology of the state. The holistic nature of Islam according to this group does not automatically mix the sacred and the profane (organization, ideology, state formation and so on) in the life of the nation and state. This group (the modernist group) views that Islam regulates world matters (including government and state) only at the level of values and basics and technically the Ummah can take other systems that it feels are valuable and useful. Among the figures of this group are Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad Husayn Haikal and Muhammad As'ad.

Based on this symbiotic paradigm, every religious leader, scholar, and other community group has the same right to participate in government. In other words, public policy taken by the state may (even must) consider the politics of accommodation towards religious groups and the various sects or denominations within them. The politics of accommodation characterizes this symbiotic paradigm or symbioticism. This politics of accommodation is not just the idea of An-Na'im's secularism argument. This idea has also been discussed by for example Bahtiar Effendy in his book *Islam and the State: Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia*. However, generally accommodation politics is still understood as a part of the secularistic paradigm, rather than as a practice of a symbiotic paradigm distinct from secularism. This is due to the use of different perspectives. Some scholars, such as Frans Sayogie, present the symbiotic paradigm as a different paradigm in religion-state relations. Likewise with Gus Dur, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and several others.

Frans Sayogie's thesis explains the symbiotic paradigm succinctly together with the other two paradigms in religion-state relations. Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Gus Dur have often conveyed the idea of a symbiotic paradigm in order to advocate Pancasila as a synthesis of various ideological ideas and philosophical traditions. This includes the moral principles of religion as the foundation of the state, which are implemented with or without formalization from the state. Scholars such as An-Na'im and Muqtedar Khan perhaps represent a perspective that posits the politics of accommodation as either part or model of the secularistic paradigm. However, some other scholars, such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Gus Dur, and Yudi Latif have a different view. The view that places accommodation politics as a characteristic of this

symbiotic paradigm is taken, among others, from the interpretations of Karno, Hatta, Hamka, and other founding figures. This second perspective gives room for the development and socialization of the symbiotic paradigm or symbioticism as the third paradigm. A middle ground in religion-state relations. Symbioticism or symbiotic paradigm can be said to be a paradigm that underlies the ideological foundation of the Indonesian nation today. Pancasila, according to Hatta, is neither a secular nor theocratic ideology. This was also agreed by Hamka, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), to Yudi Latif and several other scholars.

The symbiotic paradigm entails softer secularism, and gives freedom to religious authorities and traditions to participate in the management of public space. State authorities must hear and consider religious values and the voice of religious authorities, in formulating public policy. Similarly, religious authorities are required to safeguard national integration and public interest (*al-mashlahah al'âmah*), as well as convey the aspirations of their adherents to the incumbent government/regime. Using the dialectical method between the questions asked – or imagined to be asked – by those who oppose them, al-Ghazālī tries to assert that the life of the world is inseparable from the leading figure.

The first argument al-Ghazālī made was the importance of security. Al-Ghazali argued that a person's basic needs are health, daily food sufficiency, the presence of clothes worn. But it all does not mean if someone is still not guaranteed safety. The next argument presented by al-Ghazali is that if there is no determined leadership, all basic pleasures to pleasures such as seeking knowledge and worship will not be realized if the conditions of the region are still insecure. From here al-Ghazālī issued a number of questions that are to this day famous, such as: *Al-Dīn wa al-Sulṭān Taw'amāni* (religion and power like twins). Although al-Ghazali is not particularly known as a political thinker, some of his works contain significant political thought, such as *Nasīhat al-Mulk*, *Kimiya-yi al-Sa'âdat*, and *al-Iqtisâd fi al-I'tiqâd*.

In *nasīhat al-Mulk*, al-Ghazālī among others, hints at a parallel relationship between religion and state, as exemplified in the parallelism of prophets and kings. According to al-Ghazālī, if God had sent prophets and given them revelations, then He had also sent kings and given them "divine power" (*farr-i izadi*). Both have the same goal: the benefit of human life (*problemat-izandaghani*). Perhaps al-Ghazālī did not mean to equate prophet and king, perhaps it meant between religion and state, but his parallelism indicates high status and king or state in relation to prophet or religion. This parallelism can be interpreted as an equivalent symbiosis. This conclusion is corroborated by al-Ghazālī in *Kimiya yi Sa'adat* that religion and state are twin brothers (captives) born of one mother.

The concept of *farr-i izâdi*, which forms the basis of the symbiosis of religion and state in al-Ghazālī's thought, has historical roots in pre-Islamic Iranian thought. This concept implies that certain qualities that must be possessed by a leader or head of state, such as knowledge, justice, and wisdom. Such qualities are believed to have their origin in God and are preordained. By asserting *farr-i izadi* in the leadership of the state, al-Ghazali probably intended to assert the religious dimension in state institutions. If this is so, then al-Ghazali, like al-Mawardi, also introduced a realistic approach to reconciling religious ideals and the reality of state administration.

The secularistic paradigm or also known as secularism, is a view that separates religious affairs from state affairs. This view negates the role of religion in public affairs. Religion is put into the private sphere, which is why it should not appear in the public sphere. The secularistic

paradigm assumes that there is a clear separation between religion and state. Religion and state are two different institutions and have their own duties. So that each other must be separated and must not have a relationship. where the state is a political matter, while religion is the personal territory of each citizen. So the positive relationship that applies is also a law derived from human agreement through a social contract that has nothing to do with religious law. In accordance with Haikal's view that in the history of prophethood the Prophet SAW did not find the desire of the Prophet Muhammad to establish an Islamic state.

Unlike Europe, in the United States, secularism was born to protect religious tolerance from the coercion of the ruling class. The United States Constitution mandates the federal and state governments not to prohibit or provide assistance and support to any religious movement. While the two models of secularism (the European model and the American model) spread throughout the world and developed in various directions. Resistance to secularism also occurs in several countries, such as Iran, Pakistan, and even in Indonesia. The secularistic paradigm places religion really in the private sphere and not in the public sphere. In practice, secularism is so extreme that it rejects and prohibits all forms of religious symbols in public spaces or in the open. But in general, many countries also accept the use of religious symbols in the open as a personal individual right. That is, the use of religious symbols such as headscarves for Muslim women, turbans for Sikh men, and cross necklaces for Christians is a private matter for each individual. Thus, secularism as a paradigm in religion-state relations is not necessarily synonymous with opposition to religion, nor religious symbols.

The secularistic paradigm in its most extreme form can be said to have originated with the French Revolution and European resistance to church hegemony that justified oppressive practices in the name of religious teachings. Karl Marx then went so far as to place religion as a tool of oppression, in contrast to Nietzsche who placed religion as a tool of resistance of the oppressed. Marx and Nietzsche's theses describe the social, economic and political conditions of 19th-century European society that were full of social conflicts. The practice of slavery of that day was not yet illegal, while feudalism and capitalism strangled the workers, peasants and poor people in general. What the religious leaders did instead was to tell the slaves to remain obedient and obedient to their masters. Even the workers and the poor are given the sweet promise of the afterlife, precisely for the benefit of the landlords and capital owners.

However, some of the resistance to the hegemony of the religious leaders also used religious doctrine and dogma. This is what led Nietzsche to conclude that religion is a tool of resistance. The opposite view of Marx who put religion as a tool of oppression. Both Marx and Nietzsche were proponents of this secularistic paradigm. Both still want to free the country and society from the influence of religion and its bad leaders in their eyes. The secularistic paradigm, in the sense of separating the role of religion as one of the roles owned by the state, is in fact part of a heated debate, especially in Muslim-majority regions such as in the Middle East, about whether religion needs to be a central role owned by the state by making it the basis of a single policy of a state. The idea of secularism is also suspected to be part of the thought of modernity, especially the sociological traditions of Marxism and Liberalism which assume that the more modern humans are, the role of religion will disappear and replace with modern western ideas.

In fact, the defeat of the Arab states against Israel in the six-day war in 1967, the voices of more enthusiastic liberal thinkers brought the spirit of secularism stronger due to the

saturation of the discourse of Islamism which was considered to simplify the problem if the defeat of Arab countries was due to religious problems. Many of these liberal thinkers do not even come from religious education backgrounds such as in Al-Azhar, but from general education but are active in issues of community development and human rights, such as Farag Fouda. Farag Fouda is a later generation whose genealogy can be traced back to Muhammad Sa'id al-Asymāwī, Muhammad Khalafullah, and Farid Zakaria. In addition to them, the earlier generations were Ahmad Luthfi Sayyid, Thahā Hussein, 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, to the real figure often drawn to various currents of political thought in the Islamic world, Muhammad 'Abduh himself.

What Fouda initiated and fought for through his activism in Egypt is actually an inseparable part of the dynamic view of religious and state relations that developed from the beginning of the 19th century until Fouda's time alive. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Middle East world had a figure named Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, a philosopher and activist who diligently built relationships with activists and scholars in the Islamic world. However, his activities were often directly related to political issues in each region, even encouraging local clerics or youth to speak out to criticize the bad government to rebel (as happened when he was in Turkey when criticizing the Ottoman Empire and Shāh power in Iran), making him often expelled from a region. Al-Afghānī itself proceeds from the idea that Muslims must return to their so-called original teachings, which are in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah, if they want to rise again. He called it Salafiyyah.

The separation of religion and state requires a process called secularization, whose definitions vary considerably, including those that have been revisited. According to Peter L. Berger means "A process by which sectors of life in society and culture are released from the domination of religious institutions and symbols". The process of secularization that has implications for the marginalization of religion can differ from one country to another, which is mainly influenced by the cultural and historical background of each society. Countries based on secularism have indeed carried out this separation, although the forms of separation vary. The application of secularism is strictly found in France and the United States, while in European countries other than France the application is not too strict, so that state involvement in religious affairs in certain matters is still very clear, such as religious holidays that are used as national holidays, religious education in schools, state funding for religion, the existence of religious parties, church taxes and so on. Even as Alfred Stepan said today there are still a number of European countries that still officially recognize the institution of the church (established church) in state life, such as England, Greece and Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden).

Political secularization also occurs in the context of political modernization in developing countries, including in Muslim countries. In this regard, Donald Eugen Smith said decades ago that in fact the secularization of politics and the involvement of religion in politics go hand in hand. But according to him, secularization is really a more fundamental process, and this will gradually eliminate the phenomenon of political parties and religious ideologies. Political secularization in certain respects and to a certain degree does occur in Muslim countries, such as the establishment of modern state institutions as the embodiment of a democratic system that replaces state institutions based on religion, the formation of political parties, the holding of elections, and so on. Even a limited process of secularization occurs in religious states, which integrate religion and state such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, by legislating certain operational

rules originally derived from secular Western countries, such as legal regulations on international trade, immigration, and so on. In Islam, the most famous and outspoken figure of this sect is 'Ali 'Abd ar-Râziq. A Muslim and Egyptian scholar In 1925, 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq published a treatise entitled *al-Islâm wa Lisul al-Hukm*, which caused controversy and led to his dismissal from his position as a religious judge by a kind of Egyptian Ulema Council.

The main argument 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq is that the Caliphate has no basis in either the Qur'an or al-Hadith. These two Islamic sources do not mention the term caliphate in the sense of a caliphate that has existed in history, Moreover, there is no clear indication in the Qur'an and al-Hadith that determines a form of political system (read: state system) to be established by Muslims. 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq strongly rejected the idea that the Holy Prophet(sa) once established an Islamic state in Medina. According to him, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was merely a messenger of God, not a head of state or political leader. In the above connection, 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq intended to distinguish between religion and politics, precisely between prophetic missions and political activity. He gives considerable reasoning from a theological and historical perspective to prove that the political actions of the Holy Prophet, such as waging war, collecting jizya, and even jihad, are unrelated and do not reflect his function as a messenger of God. Share 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq, Islam is a religious entity (*wahdah dîniyyah*) that aims to bring about a single religious community (*jamâ'ah wâhidah*), based on common beliefs. In this case, 'Alî Abd. al-Râziq says:

It makes sense for the whole world to have one religion, and all humanity organized into one religious entity, but that the whole durua is governed by one government is transcending the human disposition and contrary to God's will. This kind of thing is an earthly purpose that God has left to our intellect. He has given man the freedom to manage his (worldly) affairs according to the direction of his inclinations of reason and knowledge. God's provision is that mankind must remain in diversity.

The above statement is deliberately quoted long because it contains at least two important meanings. First, that the term *jama'ah*, which means a religious community, does not mean political community. Second, although the religious community is non-political, it clearly needs political instruments to achieve its goals. It can be concluded from the view of 'Ali 'Abd al-Râziq, that Islamic society is not a political society. But there is always an opportunity for these societies to realize an Islamic form of government appropriate to the cultural context. 'Alî 'Abd. al-Râziq did not actually mean to say that Islam does not advocate the establishment of a state. On the contrary, Islam, in its view, attaches importance to political power. But this does not mean that the establishment of a state or government is one of the basic teachings of Islam In other words, political power is needed by Muslims / but not because of religious demands / but the demands of the social and political situation itself.

Methodologically, those who promote the secularistic paradigm assert that no reference can be used in the Qur'an and Hadith to prove the requirement to move the caliphate system. In the famous Qur'an "Obey Allah, Messenger and Ulil Amri" does not necessarily refer to any new political ruler. With reference to mufassir such as Baidlâwi and Zamakhshari, Râziq states that the words of Ulil Amri are interpreted as companions of the Prophet or scholars. Therefore he denied that Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had established an Islamic state in Medina. The Prophet was only the Messenger of Allah, not the king or political leader. He stated:

Muhammad was a messenger for a religious mission full of diversity, clean from the tendency towards a system of kingdoms and governments and he had neither government, nor rule, and that he did not establish an empire in the political sense either of that term or of the same meaning, because he was only a messenger like the bearer of the previous treatise. He was neither a king, nor a founder of the country, he never sought to gain power.

The next argument is to refer to Surat al-Baqarah verse: 188, this text is understood that Muhammad the Messenger of Allah had no right to anything over his people other than the right of treatise (Whitehouse, 2021). If the Prophet had been a king, he would have had the rights of a king over his people. And seeing the phenomenon of the king's power after the Prophet's wafar, he emphatically said "A king has no right to treatise, his virtue is not the primacy of the treatise, his majesty is not the majesty of the treatise." By insisting that the Prophet was not a political leader, and that the caliph was not the successor of the Prophet, the transition of political litigation from the Prophet to the caliph did not exist (Gierycz, 2020).

The Secularistic paradigm that no longer sees religion as something relevant becomes the undeniable basis for running a state, and then gives birth to ideas such as nationalism, is actually also an attempt to find alternatives to the socio-economic impasse that plagued the territories that at that time were under the rule of the 'Uthmanic Caliphate. Some intellectuals such as in Egypt there is Rifā'ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī encouraged people to increase the spirit of patriotism, where one is eager to advance the territory occupied as is done in European countries.

CONCLUSION

The paradigm of the relationship between religion and the state has three forms as has been done in state life, namely: first, the unification of religion and the state, religion in this case cannot be separated from the state, because the area of religion is a political and religious institution at the same time. Second, viewing religion and the state as symbiotically related, that is, they need each other, religion needs the state because with the state religion can develop, and also the state needs religion because with religion, the state can develop under ethical and moral guidance. Third, the secularistic paradigm, namely rejecting the basis of religion in the state

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