Volume 3, No. 4 April 2024 (0000-0000)
p-ISSN 2980-4868 | e-ISSN 2980-4841
https://ajesh.ph/index.php/gp
India Counterterrorism:
India and Pakistan's Lack of Cooperation in Fighting Lashar
e-Taiba after Mumbai Attacks 2008
Annisa
Adlina
Universitas Indonesia,
Depok, DKI Jakarta, Indonesia
Email: annisa_adlina@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
Following
the 2008 Mumbai Attacks, India refrained from engaging in counterterrorism
cooperation with Pakistan, the origin country of Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), marking a significant departure from previous
approaches. This study investigates the factors influencing India's decision
through the lens of the Prisoner's Dilemma Theory. By examining India's
strategic calculations and contextualizing them within the security dilemma
framework post-Mumbai terror, this research aims to elucidate the rationale
behind India's non-cooperative stance. Results reveal a complex interplay of
historical distrust, perceived security threats, and strategic considerations
shaping India's decision-making, highlighting the implications for future
counter-terrorism efforts and international relations strategies.
Keywords: Counter Terrorism; India; Pakistan;
Lashkar e-Taiba; Mumbai attacks.
INTRODUCTION
International
security is one of the main aspects of the study of international relations,
which emphasizes the protection of society from both military and non-military
threats
India
is faced with an increasing number of terrorist threats that are spreading
throughout the country
Many
of the previous articles criticized the Indian government in handling domestic
counter-terror cases. For example, the formation of the Intelligence Agency or
National Security Agency was only formed when a bomb exploded and did not
anticipate this beforehand
The
discussions about India and Pakistan relations in previous scientific writings
also emphasize the dynamics of relations between the two as a
whole. How these two countries were in a fairly good
situation in terms of counterterrorism efforts in 2002 but this changed when
the Mumbai Attacks occurred in 2008
This
research seeks to investigate more deeply the main background underlying
India's choice not to cooperate with Pakistan in stemming terrorism. That there
is a calculation of profit and loss beyond the ideological aspect or arms race.
Therefore, this research seeks to explain the reasons why India chose to
collaborate with other countries but not with Pakistan. Furthermore, previous
research used a broad approach so that the resulting analysis was not focused
on country calculations. In the article India-Pakistan Relations after the
Mumbai Terror Attacks, for example, Gupta et al.,
The
author argues that there are factors behind Delhi's reasons for not cooperating
in the security dilemma following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Historical aspects
show how Pakistan behaved in previous dilemmas as the main factor in India's
tendency to close down. Moreover, both have faced
border and security issues since independence in 1947. Dialogue and cooperation
have often been established but have failed, in this case, according to India,
due to Pakistan's non-compliance. As a result, India no longer has confidence
in building a cooperative dialogue with Pakistan. This assumption is then
attempted to be explained in more depth through this article using the Security
Dilemma theory as a Framework of Analysis.
This
research provides a profound understanding of India-Pakistan relations by
analyzing historical backgrounds and contemporary dynamics, highlighting
factors influencing India's strategic decisions regarding counterterrorism
cooperation. By identifying barriers such as border issues, nuclear tensions,
and historical precedents, the study not only underscores challenges to be
overcome for tangible progress in India-Pakistan relations but also offers
practical insights for foreign policy formulation and diplomacy, as well as
applying theoretical frameworks to evaluate strategic decisions in the complex
realm of international relations.
RESEARCH METHODS
This
literature review aims to delve into the factors underlying India's decision to
abstain from counterterrorism collaboration with Pakistan subsequent
to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, with specific attention directed towards the
Prisoner's Dilemma Theory. The research question is formulated to unravel the
rationale behind India's reluctance to foster cooperative dialogue with
Pakistan in addressing the threat posed by Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT).
Emphasizing India's historical engagements in counterterrorism cooperation,
such as those with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, it juxtaposes them against the
absence of such collaboration with Pakistan. Furthermore, it scrutinizes
criticisms levelled against the Indian government's management of domestic
counterterrorism cases and surveys prior scholarly works analyzing India's
cooperative endeavours with other nations in
countering terrorism.
The
review underscores the intricate dynamics characterizing India-Pakistan
relations and the manifold reasons delineated in extant research for the dearth
of counterterrorism collaboration, including territorial disputes and nuclear
tensions. To bridge the research lacuna, this study centres
on India's foundational decision to eschew counterterrorism cooperation with
Pakistan and advocates employing the Security Dilemma theory as the analytical
framework. The review delineates the research structure, comprising an
introduction, a section elucidating the analytical framework centred around the Prisoner's Dilemma Theory, a segment
detailing the research method, a discussion section, and a conclusion
encapsulating the research findings.
RESULTS
AND DISCUSSION
Prisoners’
Dilemma as Framework of Analysis
One
theory that focuses on calculations and predictions in international relations
is the Prisoners' Dilemma theory. This mathematical approach was first
formulated in IR studies by Robert Axelrod in the book The Evolution of
Cooperation (1981). This theory describes a prison situation where two
prisoners have the choice of admitting their guilt and receiving a lighter
sentence or not confessing and being released. However, the prison sentence he
gets depends not only on his choice but also on the answers of other prisoners.
Moreover, with no communication between the two detainees, each suspect must
make choices without knowing what the other party will do (Axelrod, 1981). The
depiction of this dilemma also exists in international politics where every state
actor will continue to be faced with the choice of collaborating or defecting.
Even though there are more than two actors in a system, this concept assumes
that each actor interacts one by one.
Figure
1. Depiction of the Situation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Source: Axelrod, 1981
Through the prisoner's dilemma table
above, Axelrod tries to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages that both
parties might gain. There are four scenarios in the Prisoner's Dilemma,
including working together and both parties getting a reward, party A defecting
and party B getting a heavier punishment, party B defecting, and both
defecting. Although it is not like what is described by the Prisoner's Dilemma,
where in international politics actors can still communicate, countries cannot
truly understand the goals of other countries. So, the choice to defect or
cooperate remains with each party. So what
considerations can the state take into account when acting? According to
Axelrod (1981), there are three things that can be factors for countries to
make choices.
As with repeated computer games,
interaction patterns can be a major part of how states determine choices. This
can be seen through how the second prisoner faced the previous situation and
what choices he made. If, in a similar situation, the prisoner defects, then
the option of also defecting can be considered. As a result of repeated
dilemmas, countries can likely face the same situation with the same parties.
Therefore, considerations need to be taken when calculating future profits.
Whether choosing to work together now can save you from a dilemma situation in
the future. Third, if the two countries have never faced each other before,
then the reputation of the second prisoner in the social structure can be
considered. When an opponent has a reputation as a defector, he or she will
likely defect in a prisoner's dilemma. On the other hand, when the opponent has
a good reputation, the option to cooperate can be established more easily.
India-Pakistan
Interaction in Counterterrorism
At
the beginning of its emergence in the 80s, LeT only
targeted India in the Jammu and Kashmir region. According to this group, India
has been oppressing the Muslim community there for decades. With this bond of
solidarity between fellow Muslims, the struggle emerged to fight India,
establish a state with Islamic ideology, and strive to be an important part of
the global struggle against the oppression of Muslims. LeT's
first attack occurred in 1990 when several members of the Indian Air Force were
on guard. A second attack was then carried out by LeT
in 1993 which also targeted the Indian military in the Poonch area (Mapping
Militant Organizations, 2008). Attacks in the early years of LeT's emergence were only focused on defeating Indian
troops, especially in the Jammu and Kashmir region, but LeT's
movements began to change in 1996. LeT carried out
shootings targeting the Hindu minority community in Kashmir. As a result of
this attack, 16 Hindu people died (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2008). Finally,
LeT started targeting domestic India in 2000 and
continued to grow in the following years. The peak was the 2008 Mumbai attacks
which became a turning point in the counter-terrorism cooperation dialogue
between India and Pakistan.
India and Pakistan are the two
largest countries in South Asia by region. Both succeeded in gaining
independence from the British in 1947, but the division of the former colonial
territory was considered by Pakistan to be less suitable. According to
Islamabad, the city of Jammu and Kashmir should be part of its country because the majority of the population adheres to Islam. This
disagreement ultimately gave rise to endless conflict, even to this day. Apart
from border issues, they were also faced with the nuclear arms race which began
to develop during the Cold War period. India first conducted nuclear tests in
1974 and has developed very rapidly since 1988. On the other hand, Pakistan
also began carrying out nuclear development in 1971. Apart from being a
response to India's nuclear weapons, this decision was also due to Pakistan's
defeat due to separatist movements in the Eastern region. (Tellis,
2022). As a result, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan tried
to develop these weapons quickly. The first trial was then carried out in 1983
and continued in 1998. The third aspect that also influenced the dynamics of
the relationship between the two was the issue of terrorism in security.
Dialogue regarding terrorism has
been built by India and Pakistan since the 80s. In 1984, India asked Pakistan
to punish the perpetrators of the 1981 hijacking and Pakistan agreed. The next
year, the two countries also carried out a Joint Dialogue Process which
discussed the issues of terrorism, security, and immigration (Kiani, 2019). Dialogue is also carried out at the regional
level, as in 1997. In this SAARC Summit, both Pakistan and India agreed to
build trust, especially on the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking. Apart
from that, state leaders have also started making visits to neighboring
countries as a form of their seriousness in building better relations. Even in
this Joint Dialogue, discussions regarding Jammu and Kashmir were also included
to resolve the issue quickly (Padder, 2012). However, this harmony did not last
long because in 1999, the Kargil War occurred, and dialogue failed again.
Apart from acts of terror in the
United States in 2001, India also faced the same problem. There was an attack
on the Indian Parliament Building on December 13. Accusations regarding
Pakistan's involvement in terrorist groups are further aggravated in this
situation. India assesses that its neighboring country is providing support for
LeT to attack its country. Responding to this, the
Pakistani government, through the Spokesperson for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, stated that the accusations were baseless, and India did not provide
clear evidence (Anwar, 2019). Even the official website of the Pakistani
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) also considers that the attack that occurred
twelve years ago was propaganda carried out by the Indian government. Even
though they were in a bad situation, the two countries held a Joint Dialogue
again in October 2002 and continued by building better diplomatic relations in
2004.
2004 was described as the best year
in the normalization of India-Pakistan relations, which had been established
since the Joint Dialogue in 1997 (Padder, 2012). This year, the two of them
discussed various important issues including the economy, Jammu & Kashmir,
terrorism, and five other issues. This dialogue also initiated further cooperation
in counter-terrorism and a commitment to form a new
institution. During this normalization, Pakistani President Musharraf also
emphasized again that Pakistan would not be a place for terrorists to take
refuge (Kiani, 2019). This harmony went well until
the following year when the two countries' transportation was added. Not only
adding to the Delhi to Lahore itinerary, the two are also building maritime
cooperation through maritime cooperation.
In 2006, there was an attack on a
Mumbai train that killed 180 people and injured 800 others (Mapping Militant
Organizations, 2018). This attack allegedly carried out by LeT
has again reduced India's confidence in Pakistan. In fact, in the previous
year's Joint Dialogue, the Pakistani government had condemned and promised not
to make its country a place for terrorists to nest. However, attacks were still
carried out by LeT and killed nearly 200 people. In
this case, India again accused Pakistan of being the mastermind behind this
incident. Yashwant Sinha, who is an Indian politician, stated that the
negotiations between the two parties would not resolve anything because
Pakistan continued to carry out violence against India (Fayyaz, 2009). Two
months after the attack, the two met in Havana in September 2006 (Padder,
2012). In this meeting, both of them again emphasized
cooperation in fighting the threat of terrorism even in a bad situation.
The next Joint Dialogue was held in
2007, and it discussed counter-terrorism cooperation again. In this meeting, both of them again condemned acts of terrorism and were
serious about fighting them. The following year, the two met again to discuss
the issue of terrorism and drug trafficking (Padder, 2012). However, just as
the meeting was being held, the Mumbai attacks occurred which ultimately became
a turning point in relations between the two. India can no longer trust
Pakistan in its efforts to fight terrorism and has promised not to make its
territory a haven for terror groups, especially LeT.
Even though dialogue has been
attempted before, it is difficult to develop a stable situation for a long time
and trust because of India's disappointment with Pakistan. This mistrust began
in 1989 when a resistance group attempted to attack India in the Kashmir
region. In this action, sympathizers also called for independence from India
and some of them wanted to join Pakistan. The Pakistani government then
provided moral and diplomatic support and India considered that Pakistan had
encouraged separatist groups to attack its country. Apart from that, the
dialogue that has been built over decades has not shown significant results and
tends to stagnate. This is because the LeT threat
still exists and is even increasing and the group is still headquartered in
Pakistan.
Many
parties also believe that Lashkar e-Taiba has strong support from Pakistani
intelligence forces. This is because LeT's vision and
mission are in line with the Pakistani government in seizing the Jammu and
Kashmir region. Apart from that, LeT is also believed
to have received funding assistance and facilities such as schools and
hospitals from the Pakistani government (Hashim, 2019; Macander,
2021). Moreover, even though Musharraf has emphasized his efforts to eradicate
terror groups based in Pakistan, LeT
attacks and threats remain and continue to give rise to India's domestic
security instability. Therefore, seeing the previous pattern of bilateral
interactions with Pakistan on counter-terrorism issues, it is difficult for
India to trust its neighbor and the choice to defect in the next dilemma
situation is more likely to be carried out.
Lack of
Rewards in India-Pakistan Counter Terrorism
In
the prisoner's dilemma, the party who defected does not receive punishment but
has a negative impact on other prisoners. This also happens in state situations
where no punishment will be received when the state does not choose to
cooperate. However, in repeated dilemmas, countries will tend to cooperate
because of rewards or what Axelrod calls payoffs. Cooperation is chosen by
countries, of course, to achieve maximum interests and profits. India also did
this when building a security dialogue with Pakistan in the 80s. Discussions
about security are trying to be built to safeguard society against acts of
terror and fight terrorism. However, instead of reducing the number of terror
attacks, Lashkar e-Taiba became increasingly active in carrying out attacks and
began targeting Indian civilians in 2000. Moreover, when India and other
countries urged Pakistan to take action in prosecuting
the perpetrators of terror, Pakistan tended to move slowly.
Counter-terrorism has indeed been
actively carried out by Pakistan, but its strategy only applies to groups that
target the country's security, such as the Taliban (Tellis,
2012). The policy was not implemented as harshly when the government faced LeT, which had been targeting Jammu, Kashmir, and India. In
the case of the LeT bombing of the Indian
Parliamentary Office in 2001, for example, there was involvement of the
Pakistani government which was reported by Indian security advisors (Coll,
2006). There was no response issued by Pakistan until, finally, the US put
pressure on Islamabad to contribute to finding the perpetrator and bringing him
to justice. Apart from the United States, India also continues to pressure and
give ultimatums to its neighboring countries. After the Mumbai Attacks, for
example, Pranab Mukherjee, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of India,
contacted the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan directly to truly commit
to prohibiting the use of Pakistani territory as a sanctuary for terrorism.
Apart from that, Delhi also asked Pakistan to hand over the fugitives. However,
despite condemning and denying its involvement, Pakistan took a slow time in
formulating a response to the surrender (France24, 2008).
Calculation of future profits can
also be seen through the intelligence aspect. This aspect is taken
into account because the counter-terror cooperation carried out by the
country - in this case, India - with other countries is expected to benefit
from it by providing information to identify future threats. For example,
intelligence assistance was provided by the US when establishing a
counter-terror cooperation dialogue with India through reports regarding LeT threats through the FBI (Nayak & Krepon, 2012).
Furthermore, a few days after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the US government
also deployed an FBI team to India to help solve the case. This advantage is
then hoped for by countries in a dilemma of choosing to cooperate rather than
defect.
What happened with the US was, in
fact, not the same when dealing with Pakistan. In previous security dilemmas,
Pakistan did not provide intelligence regarding terror attacks targeting India.
Even India considers that the Pakistani intelligence organization called
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also provides assistance
and support to terrorism. ISI is a Pakistani intelligence agency founded in
1948. Its task is to collect and analyze information that is useful for
national security (Pathania, 2020). In the 2000s,
when General Pervez Musharraf served as President of Pakistan, this
organization was given the authority to provide support or weaken major
domestic parties so that they remain obedient and loyal to the government. ISI
provides support to groups that have an Islamic fundamentalist ideology, namely
LeT and Harkat-ul-Ansar (Pathania, 2020). This is what India considers Islamabad's
support for terror groups targeting its country. Therefore, the benefits
obtained both now and the things that are promising in the future are not
obtained by India, so the choice to cooperate becomes increasingly difficult.
Apart from calculating profits, there is an assessment of the reputation of
other countries which is also an important consideration in dilemma situations.
Pakistan's
Reputation in SAARC as a Consideration for Cooperation
In
a prisoner's dilemma, players may meet each other for the first time. So, the
two of them don't have a previous interaction pattern. According to Axelrod
(1981), another consideration that can be chosen is the reputation of other
players in a social structure. In the case of India and Pakistan, both are
members of a regional organization called the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation or SAARC. An organization founded in January 1987 that
aims to improve the welfare and quality of life of people in the region (SAARC,
2020). At the time of its formation, India and Pakistan were in a bad situation
and were skeptical about the establishment of a regional organization. However,
after several years of its founding, Pakistan began to realize the importance
of SAARC in the region's progress.
Since the beginning of the formation
of SAARC, Pakistan has expressed its concern about member countries' nuclear
explosion tests which could threaten regional stability (Murthy, 1999). In
1990, Islamabad also emphasized efforts for faster and more comprehensive
global arms control. As a member country, Pakistan is also active in providing
other ideas beyond security to be included in the SAARC Summit. In 1986, for
example, when hosting the summit, Pakistan suggested holding special activities
for women (Arif, 2018). At the tenth SAARC Summit,
Pakistan also proposed ideas regarding peace, security, and development in
South Asia. In this meeting, Pakistan also encouraged good bilateral relations
between each member country and strengthened the role of the organization if
there were tensions between member countries (Murthy, 1999). Since its founding
in 1987, Pakistan has also hosted summits in 2004 and 2016. In 2004, Pakistan
hosted the twelfth conference, which focused on examining economic,
technological, social, cultural, environmental, and handling aspects of
terrorism. Finally, the nineteenth conference was held in Pakistan in 2016 but
was not attended by India because it believed that the Pakistani government was
involved in the Uri terror act.
At the regional level, even though
Pakistan has played an active role since the beginning of the formation of
SAARC, India still considers the bad intentions of its neighboring country's
presence as a form of spying on India. Apart from that, India's disappointment
was also caused by Pakistan's attitude which was considered slow in fighting
cross-border terrorism. Terrorists affiliated with ISIS are also spreading in
South Asian countries and maximum counter-terror efforts cannot work if
Pakistan continues to protect and provide support for them. SAARC is considered
unable to develop like the EU and ASEAN because of the dispute between India
and Pakistan (Reza, 2016; Murthy, 1999). However, for India, Pakistan's
presence hinders this regional organization's movement. Due to Pakistan's bad
reputation for India at the regional level, the choice to defect is greater
than collaborating in a dilemma.
In a prisoner's dilemma, players may
meet each other for the first time. So, the two of them don't have a previous
interaction pattern. According to Axelrod (1981), another consideration that
can be chosen is the reputation of other players in a social structure. In the
case of India and Pakistan, both are members of a regional organization called
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation or SAARC. An organization
founded in January 1987 that aims to improve the welfare and quality of life of
people in the region (SAARC, 2020). At the time of its formation, India and
Pakistan were in a bad situation and were skeptical about the establishment of
a regional organization. However, after several years of its founding, Pakistan
began to realize the importance of SAARC in the region's progress.
Since the beginning of the formation
of SAARC, Pakistan has expressed its concern about member countries' nuclear
explosion tests which could threaten regional stability (Murthy, 1999). Apart
from that, in 1990 Islamabad also emphasized efforts for faster and more
comprehensive global arms control. As a member country, Pakistan is also active
in providing other ideas beyond the security aspect to be included in the SAARC
Summit. In 1986, for example, when hosting the summit, Pakistan suggested
holding special activities for women (Arif, 2018). At
the tenth SAARC Summit, Pakistan also proposed ideas regarding peace, security,
and development in South Asia. In this meeting, Pakistan also encouraged good
bilateral relations between each member country and strengthened the role of
the organization if there were tensions between member countries (Murthy,
1999). Since its founding in 1987, Pakistan has also hosted summits in 2004 and
2016. In 2004, Pakistan hosted the twelfth conference, which focused on
examining economic, technological, social, cultural, environmental, and
handling aspects of terrorism. Finally, the nineteenth conference was held in
Pakistan in 2016 but was not attended by India because it believed that the
Pakistani government was involved in the Uri terror act.
At the regional level, even though
Pakistan has played an active role since the beginning of the formation of
SAARC, India still considers the bad intentions of its neighboring country's
presence as a form of spying on India. Apart from that, India's disappointment
was also caused by Pakistan's attitude which was considered slow in fighting
cross-border terrorism. Terrorists affiliated with ISIS are also spreading in
South Asian countries and maximum counter-terror efforts cannot work if
Pakistan continues to protect and provide support for them. SAARC is considered
unable to develop like the EU and ASEAN because of the dispute between India
and Pakistan (Reza, 2016; Murthy, 1999). However, for India, Pakistan's
presence hinders this regional organization's movement. Due to Pakistan's bad
reputation for India at the regional level, the choice to defect is greater
than collaborating in a dilemma.
CONCLUSION
A
country's geographical proximity often influences its interaction with other
countries. However, the closer a country is, the greater the conflict and
disputes occur. This also happens in the situation of India and Pakistan which
have a long history in aspects of security, ideology, borders, territorial
division, and so on. Since the beginning of independence in 1947, both have
faced a crisis over the Jammu and Kashmir region which continues to this day.
For Pakistan, Kashmir, which is inhabited by a Muslim majority, should be part
of its country. On the other hand, Kashmir also provides additional strength to
India in terms of territorial area, community diversity, and borders. Moreover,
India and Pakistan can also use this area against each other. This instability
is also exploited by radical groups to achieve their respective interests. One
of them is the Lashkar e-Taiba terrorist, which is also the main discussion in
this article, which has targeted attacks in Jammu and Kashmir since the early
90s.
In contrast to terrorists from Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh, India did not establish counter-terror cooperation with
Pakistan in fighting LeT, especially after the 2008
Mumbai Attacks. As illustrated in the prisoner's dilemma situation, Delhi tends
to defect because of Pakistan's attitude which is considered
to be siding with them. LeT is the enemy.
Before the terror act in Mumbai in 2008, both were in a good situation and were
trying to strengthen cooperation in the security aspect. However, this changed
in reverse after the LeT attack which killed hundreds
of Indians. Even though, in several speeches, the Islamabad government has
condemned and explained its non-participation in the bombing, India remained
reluctant to dialogue and improve relations for at least several years
afterwards.
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